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The collection of essays presented in this volume is dedicated to the analysis of 
different theoretical and practical aspects of criticism in China and Vietnam. 
The composition of the volume reveals three major points of investigation. 
Firstly, using a comparative framework, light is shed on some specific features of 
philosophical criticism in the Occident, engaging the reader in speculation on 
affinities and differences in critical judgment in the East Asian and Western cul-
tural traditions. This analytical perspective is represented in the volume by Sté-
phane Feuillas’s introductory note, as well as by François De Gandt’s concluding 
essay “Tastes and Rules: Manners of Western Criticism.” Secondly, literary criti-
cism in China is dealt with from a historical perspective in the section entitled 
“The Birth of Literary Judgment”, which includes two essays: François Martin’s 
“Judging the Man, Judging the Work” and Valérie Lavoix’s “Liu Xie’s Disen-
chantment: Attitudes and Duties of the Literary Critic as stated in the Chapter 
‘Connoisseur’ of the Wenxin diaolong.” Thirdly a variety of modes of judgment 
in East Asia are discussed in the sections “On Critical Contrasts”, i.e. Romain 
Graziani’s “A Byway through Fauna: Some Thoughts on the Wildlife in the 
Zhuangzi” and Stéphane Feuillas’ “Thinking through Contrasting: The Critic of 
Buddhism and the Textual Strategies in Zhang Zai’s Zhengmeng”, and “On Clas-
sifying and Excluding”, that is Emmanuel Poisson’s “From Criticism to Reform 
of the Bureaucracy in Classical Vietnam” and Rainier Lanselle’s “Others as 
Fools: Criticism as Process of Exclusion.” 
Due to the broad scope of the subject, it seems only natural that the authors of 
the essays have carefully selected their material in order to reflect the most cru-
cial stages in the development of critical discourse in East Asian and European 
philosophical thought, as well as some of the most prominent problems that have 
hitherto not been sufficiently discussed. The scope of the investigation is laid out 
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by Stéphane Feuillas in his introductory note (pp. 6-11). While he admits to the 
abundance of material, that is critical judgments scattered through “all fields of 
knowledge”1 in the East Asian tradition, he calls attention to its relative indiffer-
ence towards systematizing and constructing a critical spirit. Since this introduc-
tion reflects the methodological attitude to the subject shared by the whole group 
of contributors, it seems necessary to cite further a passage in which the compara-
tive framework of the analysis is explained:  
 
[For the East Asian tradition], we should admit the absence of 
any theorization of the critical modality as such. It is a pecu-
liar fact that the essentials of philosophical reflection and the 
conceptual equipment, which from Plato to Kant had been 
used to define this activity, were not present here (p. 6). 
 
One cannot but agree with the author that the Kantian tables of categories were 
not formulated in the Orient. Consequently the question then is: What purpose is 
a similar observation supposed to serve in a volume dedicated to critical judg-
ment, especially if we keep in mind that the subject is being discussed in Papers 
on Comparative Studies? Having been mentioned in the introductory remarks, 
the name of Kant does not appear in any of the subsequent essays. Neither Im-
manuel Kant’s (1724-1804) Critique of Judgment (1790) nor Denis Diderot’s 
(1713-1784) Salons (1759-1781)―most prominent works in the development of 
critical discourse on taste and aesthetic judgment in the Western philosophical 
tradition―are mentioned by any of the contributors to this volume at all, and this 
does not seem to be justified. It is a well-known fact that Friedrich Nietzsche 
(1844-1900) articulated his scathing criticism of the Kantian tables, calling their 
author repeatedly “a Chinaman of Königsberg.”2 The corpus of Kant’s philoso-
phy did not develop against an ideally constructed cultural background dating 
back to Plato and isolated from extra-European influences. On the contrary, it 
was created in the Age of Enlightenment, in an atmosphere of extraordinarily 
intensive cultural contacts between East and West. One of the fruits of these 
contacts was the Oratio de Sinarum philosophia practica (Speech on the Practi-
cal Philosophy of the Chinese) (1721) of Christian Wolff (1679-1754), a figure 
of extreme importance in any comparative study of critical judgment in China 
and the West, and a well-known precursor and opponent of Kant.3 The exact 
extent of Wolff’s influence on Kant, as well as the problem of assessing the rela-
tionship between Kant’s categorical imperative and Chinese philosophy, requires 
further investigation, and such an investigation could contribute a great deal to 
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our understanding both of Kant and of Chinese philosophy. For this reason, to 
introduce the topic of criticism by drawing sharp contrasts between the Kantian 
tables and the ‘not systematizing’ critical tradition in East Asia seems to be both 
historically and methodologically suspect.  
On the other hand, the observation by Feuillas of the absence of a ‘systema-
tizing critical spirit’ as characteristic of Chinese philosophy is interesting, as it 
implicitly concerns the methodology of any comparative research. In his inaugu-
ral lecture “On the Concept of Beauty in the Chinese Theories of Art” at the 
University of Heidelberg in 1968, Günther Debon focussed his attention on a 
variety of metaphysical restrictions with which the concept mei 美 ‘beautiful’ had 
been confronted in Chinese aesthetics. The general meaning of mei was charac-
terized by Debon as “sensually perceivable beauty”,4 as a force able to stir up 
emotions and agitate the mind. In the European tradition this captivating quality 
of beauty was regarded as a most powerful spiritual force, and in the Age of 
Romanticism music, the art of movement par excellence, was elevated to the 
highest rank in the hierarchy of arts. In China, on the other hand, aesthetic 
thought was oriented towards disciplining the emotions, hence the directness of 
sensual effect associated with the concepts of mei 美 ‘beautiful’ and se 色 ‘col-
our’ had to be restrained. In the course of time, a number of concepts were elabo-
rated instead in order to delineate the aesthetic ideal, avoiding the perturbing 
dangers of sensibility, the most prominent among them being the concepts qi 氣 
‘pneuma’, yin 隠 ‘concealed’ and xiu 秀 ‘sublime’. Debon illustrates the devel-
opment of these concepts in theory and practice with various examples, from the 
Wenxin diaolong 文 心 雕 龍 (The Literary Mind and the Carving of Dragons) 
by Liu Xie 劉 勰 (c. 465-522), a work he calls “the most systematic [sic!] and 
all-embracing poetics in China”5 to monochrome painting from the ninth to thir-
teenth centuries. However different the evaluation of sensually perceivable 
beauty may have been in the European and Chinese traditions both develop a 
systematic discourse in which sensibility is critically reflected on. Debon ob-
serves how the differences in judgment influenced the development of the whole 
system of the arts,6 the predominant arts in China being poetry, calligraphy and 
painting, i.e. the arts that served the cultivation of a specific learned taste and 
supported the ‘junzi 君 子’ during his official duties. A less favourable fate 
shared by other arts, such as architecture, music, drama and fiction can be ex-
plained only if these are seen as elements of a system, in terms of a common 
denominator characteristic of the whole body of the transmitted aesthetic judg-
ments. 
This systematic view of Chinese aesthetics suggested by Debon is very fruit-
ful for any approach to critical spirit in China. Its various aspects are well illus-
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trated in each of the essays in the volume under review. If we try to determine the 
common denominator among all the critical judgments investigated in the vol-
ume, we might have to consider the specific quality of Chinese thought, which 
did not—as was the case with ancient Greece—regard ethics as a separate branch 
of philosophy, but one that permeates all fields of philosophy, including ontol-
ogy, gnoseology and aesthetics. The subject is broached by François Martin in 
his essay “Judging the Man, Judging the Work” (pp. 13-31). The author discusses 
the functionality of poetic art in ancient China, focussing his attention first on the 
process by which the status of an official classic was established for the songs 
contained in the Shijing 詩 經 (The Book of Odes; c. 1000-c. 600 BC). Having 
been divested of their original popular meaning, the songs had come to be seen 
not merely as an object of judgment but “as an instrument of judgment passed on 
man and society”.7 Martin discusses a number of texts regarded as the earliest 
poetological approaches to literary art, from the “Great Preface” (Da xu 大 序) to 
the Shijing (Book of Odes) up to the Shipin 詩 品 (Evaluation of Poetry) of 
Zhong Hong 鍾 嶸 (c. 467-518), and observes a constant tendency for poetry in 
Early China to be interpreted in terms of ethics.  
Martin’s essay is followed by Valérie Lavoix’s discussion (pp. 34-53) of the 
forty-eighth chapter Zhi yin 知 音 (An Understanding Critic) of Liu Xie’s (c. 
465-522) Wenxin diaolong (The Literary Mind and the Carving of Dragons). The 
choice of the subject in this essay is felicitous as it is dedicated to the evaluation 
of literate criticism at the time of the Six Dynasties (AD 220-589), when litera-
ture gained relative freedom from serving the state. For this reason, the essays of 
Martin and Lavoix give a quite representative account of the main paradigm of 
Chinese aesthetic criticism at the time of its birth. In the chapter Zhi yin, Liu Xie 
defines the qualities he expects of a good literary critic, who alone is able to 
discern the hidden value of a real work of art and to perceive its inward beauty, 
which is concealed from vulgar minds.8 Lavoix interprets these expectations not 
as merely descriptive, but as part of a literary manifest of a literary critic requir-
ing a strong sense of responsibility, as he is “called to be a witness to and a pro-
moter of exceptional talents, a supporter and guarantor of beauty.”9 This appeal 
to the responsibilities of an understanding critic is an illuminating example of the 
strength with which the ethical criteria of judgment were applied in China, not 
only to the works of official writing, but to belles lettres as well.  
Lavoix provides a detailed interpretation of what Liu Xie considers to be the 
major difficulties a critic is usually confronted with before he is able to fulfil his 
responsibility: the prejudice that lets an inexperienced mind decide in favour of 
the old masters in spite of the possible accomplishments in the works of the 
critic’s contemporaries, rivalry among literati, and, finally, ignorance. Lavoix’s 
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analysis is well articulated, but it is a pity that she does not draw any parallels 
between the Chinese and European traditions. In fact, the dictum of Liu Xie is 
strikingly reminiscent of the debates held on the same topic in the eighteenth 
century in Europe, during the age of Enlightenment when aesthetics had been 
introduced as a separate branch of philosophy. Among the twelve difficulties of 
aesthetic judgment discussed by Diderot in his essay “The Beautiful” (1751), 
ignorance and blind prejudice in favour of old masters figure as the first and the 
last.10 David Hume (1711-1776) demands that a critic should “preserve his mind 
free from all prejudice, and allow nothing to enter his consideration, but the very 
object which is submitted to his examination.”11 The necessity of cultivating 
one’s mind regarded by Liu Xie as a conditio sine qua non for any sound literary 
judgment, his appeal to the critic’s experience12, plays a crucial role in the works 
of Diderot,13 Hume14 and Kant15, to mention only these three most prominent 
fondateurs du discours on aesthetic judgment and taste in Europe. Liu Xie’s 
demand for ‘disinterestedness’ (wu si 無 私) on the part of the literary critic16 
and the concept of ‘disinterested pleasure’ (interesseloses Wohlgefallen) in 
Kant’s Critique of Judgment, the problem of the interrelation between ethics and 
aesthetics in Liu Xie’s poetics compared with the same problem in Europe, these 
are just a few of a large spectrum of questions forming one of the most exciting 
topics in comparative studies. 
The difficulty of judgment dealt with in the contribution of Romain Graziani 
“A Byway through Fauna: Some Thoughts on the Wildlife in the Zhuangzi” (pp. 
55-87) takes us back from the time of the Six Dynasties (AD 220-589) to the 
period of the Warring States (BC 480–221). The material analysed also suggests 
a change in subject, as Graziani discusses a text traditionally regarded as a major 
source of Daoist philosophy not a work of literary criticism. However, the in-
sights he gains while interpreting the Zhuangzi are highly relevant for the topic of 
aesthetic judgment and aesthetic functionality. 
The use of animal imagery is a major artistic tool in the philosophical system 
of the Zhuangzi. Even the compositional structure of the work indicates the im-
portance of fauna for its authors, as the ‘stylistic strongholds’ of the text - the 
beginning characters of its first chapter17 introducing a huge fish kun 魚 昆 from 
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the Northern Ocean, and the concluding passage of its last, the thirty third chap-
ter, where the abilities of Hui Shi are compared to those of a mosquito18 -  both 
employ animal imagery. The complicated world of animal imagery the reader 
comes across while moving from the huge fish to the small mosquito is the sub-
ject of interpretation in Graziani’s article. 
The starting point of his analysis is consideration of the necessity to read the 
text of the Zhuangzi and to approach its imagery bearing in mind the spiritual 
atmosphere of the time at which the text was composed, as well as the use of 
similar imagery by thinkers of antiquity with whom the authors of the text must 
have been familiar.19 The socio-centred systems of thought, such as Confucian-
ism, Mohism and Legalism, that proclaimed the importance of definite norms of 
social behaviour regulated by ritual, knowledge of ethical education or by the 
law, measured the whole natural world according to these norms as well. The 
extension of the moral principles to the whole of tianxia 天 下 (the known world) 
including the world of animals, among other things the view that man is capable 
of improving wilderness and the beneficial influence of ritual music on unculti-
vated beings, is illustrated by Graziani with regard to a number of texts, mostly 
from the Confucian canon, and is seen as an element of discourse crucial for 
understanding the imagery in the Zhuangzi. According to Graziani, the authors of 
the Zhuangzi refuted this view of an interaction between man and the animal 
world that is primarily articulated in social terms as a misconception, as a product 
of conceited human reasoning that regards social welfare as a central value, 
forces the artifacts of ritual, law and music upon the world of nature, and thus 
irretrievably destroys the harmony between man and the vital source of the dao. 
Most of the animal imagery we find in the Zhuangzi is called upon to challenge 
this misconception.  
One of the first passages used by Graziani is taken from the chapter “Waiwu” 
外 物. It is the well-known story about a divine tortoise caught by fisherman Yu 
Qie 余 且. Using its spiritual powers, the tortoise appears in a dream to prince 
Yuan of Song and asks him for help. After awakening, the prince searches for the 
tortoise and eventually finds it. However, instead of liberating the magic animal, 
the prince has it dispatched and used for divination, every single one of which 
turns out to be true. The ‘usefulness’ of the slain tortoise is immediately reflected 
upon by Confucius, who frequently appears in the Zhuangzi as a Daoist acolyte 
converted to the teaching of Laozi. Confucius criticizes the silliness of the tor-
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toise - by appearing to the prince in a dream and being of great use for divination, 
it could not maintain its own life. Sophisticated reasoning, the rescue plan the 
tortoise resorts to, is nothing but xiaozhi 小 知 ‘small wisdom’20, which results in 
falling away from the natural course of the dao.  
This episode is analyzed by Graziani in the part entitled ‘Tortures of the Tor-
toise: The Critique of the Divination’. As the title suggests, the tortoise episode 
may be interpreted as a skeptical attitude towards the use and abuse of animals in 
divinatory practice and as criticism of the ritual abuse of animals as a whole. 
However, the author goes much further, as he suggests―and this seems to be one 
of the major insights of his article―that it is not a natural phenomenon in the 
teeth of the civilizing activities of men, the suffering of a captured animal that the 
authors of the Zhuangzi are calling to the readers’ attention, but rather the failure 
of any human activity that aims at subsuming the natural order into the concep-
tual frame of social norms. As man is part of this world of nature and is in search 
of a harmony with universal principles that has been lost, any such activity forces 
him to lose a significant part of himself, to fall away from the dao, and that is 
why the Zhuangzi reveals the condition of man himself when speaking of the 
tortoise. In this sense, the meaning the image of the tortoise is invested with is 
defined in terms that prove to be applicable to the whole of the bestiary in the 
Zhuangzi:  
 
The tortoise is not a victim of men’s conspiring. It should be 
interpreted as an allegory for the situation of the human 
world. [This allegory] shows that under the varnished cover 
of appearances, behind the accomplishments that are all too 
readily appraised, there are cracks and splits afflicting the vi-
tal activity.21  
 
Graziani observes an emblematic quality of the animal figures in the Zhuangzi. 
They cannot be perceived of as belonging to some ideal reality, and they are not 
necessarily positive images throughout the whole text, as he demonstrates with 
the episode from the chapter “Xu Wugui” 徐 無 鬼, where the zhenren 真 人 
(authentic man), considering his position within the human community, associ-
ates himself with the fish, but discards the way of life characteristic of sheep and 
ants.22 On the other hand, the boundary between man and animal is not an em-
piric one either, as it should be rather understood in terms of mental categories, 
as “emblems of certain forms of the existence.”23 
It should be added that the emblematic use of animal imagery in the Chinese 
literary tradition was not exclusively connected with the Daoist system of 
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thought. A well-known example may be taken from the chapter “Zheng Jian” 正 
諫 of the Shuoyuan 說 苑 by Liu Xiang 劉 向 (BC 77-76). It contains a story in 
which counselor Shao Ruzi 少 孺 子 advises the king of Wu against his plans to 
conquer the state of Chu, as such a campaign might imply considerable risks for 
the state of Wu. Shao Ruzi does not admonish his sovereign directly, but recounts 
what he has just seen in the garden: A cicada drinking sweet dew did not see the 
mantis lurking behind its back, the mantis preying on the cicada did not notice 
the finch hunting nearby, and the finch who is ready to catch the mantis falls 
victim to a sling-shot from beneath.24 This emblematic use of animal imagery is 
employed to support the idea of the proper art of admonishing as well as the art 
of wise government; animal imagery is thus inscribed into a Confucian discourse 
with its stress on social benefit.  
Both the symbolic and the emblematic uses of animal imagery seem to be 
universally accepted by different systems of thought in ancient China. However, 
the main purport of Graziani’s analysis is not to classify all the patterns of such 
use, but to present the animal imagery of the Zhuangzi as part of a systematic 
program that refutes the concept of social usefulness and any attempt to subsume 
images of nature into a humanist discourse. This systematic view is also sup-
ported by his extending of the contrastive interpretation of animal imagery onto 
the concept of time in the Zhuangzi: The golden age of harmony between man 
and the dao is considered not as a utopian construct, not as an ideal historical 
period like that of Yao and Shun, but as “naturalness within us”,25 as a concept 
of “how things could be, of a power drawn from the source of the vital activ-
ity.”26 The figure that represents the realization of this concept better than any-
one else in the Zhuangzi is the enlightened Confucius, who cherishes the idea of 
leaving his disciples and friends, of being dressed in skins, of eating acorns and 
chestnuts and of being able to pass wild beasts and birds without frightening 
them.27 A striking contrast indeed, if one bears in mind Confucius’ statement as 
it is recorded in the Lunyu about the impossibility for him to associate with birds 
and animals.28  
Many of the key ideas in the article of Graziani are in accord with Roel 
Sterckx’s seminal study The Animal and the Daemon in Early China, where the 
representation of the natural world as seen in ancient Chinese texts is considered 
different from their counterpart in the European tradition inasmuch as they re-
flected the natural world not as an object of naturalist enquiry but as projections 
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of human categories upon nature, as ‘socially constructed’29 perceptions. Graz-
iani’s analysis of the emblematic and allegorical quality of style in the Zhuangzi 
sustains the power of imagination as a vital element in the ‘anti-utilitarian’30 
treatment of animal imagery, which―if we paraphrase the Sterckx’s expression 
above―are here ‘socially deconstructed’ and inscribed into a polemical dis-
course with socio-centered philosophical systems. 
If we now venture to look at how the Zhuangzi is treated in contemporary 
Chinese Sinology, the title of the volume under review On the Difficulty of 
Judgment would hardly appear to be a truism. In a recent study entitled “On the 
Symbolic Meaning of Fish in the Zhuangzi”, Professor Wei Yixia 魏 義 霞 ap-
proaches the imagery of the Zhuangzi in a way quite different from Graziani. 
Most interesting is the difference in discourse. Instead of speculating on the po-
lemic dimension of the Daoist text and without drawing any parallels with works 
from other philosophical schools, Wei regards the concept of equality of animal 
and man as the central idea of the Zhuangzi. The main achievement of the 
Zhuangzi is seen as being its having ensured the animal world’s right to be the 
true mirror and teacher of the human race, as well as in having proclaimed an 
equal status of animal and man. Wei further considers the vision of the world in 
the Zhuangzi to be “a wise conception of protecting the true nature of animals, a 
theory that is imbued with the wisdom of ecological ethics.”31 This last remark 
enables the figure of Zhuangzi himself to join the ranks of what Sterckx calls 
“socially constructed perceptions”; it demonstrates that in China the mental proc-
ess of socially constructing the known world is at present as real as it was in the 
time of the Warring States. 
In conclusion, the book under review provides views on a broad range of in-
teresting issues concerning the theory and practice of criticism in East Asia. The 
contrastive critical mode discussed by Graziani using the example of the 
Zhuangzi is further illustrated by Stéphane Feuillas in his essay on the polemical 
style of Zhang Zai’s (1020-1078) Zhengmeng (pp. 89-116). Emmanuel Poisson 
and Rainier Lanselle reflect upon critical modality in politics (Poisson’s essay on 
the art of administration in Vietnam, pp. 117-137) and literature (Lanselle’s con-
tribution on Jin Shengtan’s (1610-1661) commentary on the Xixiang ji, pp. 139-
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161). The material chosen for the discussion is extremely informative, as it repre-
sents the mechanisms of criticism from its birth up to the Qing dynasty (1644-
1911). 
However, there are two areas where the volume could have been improved. 
First, when referring to various aspects of criticism in East Asia, the authors 
themselves are rather uncritical about the actual state of research on the matters 
discussed. For example, analyzing the interpretations of the Shijing (Book of 
Odes) in terms of political ethics, François Martin does not mention Marcel Gra-
net’s (1884-1940) pioneering study Fêtes et chansons anciennes de la Chine 
(1929), where the subject of the interrelation between literary and official criti-
cism in Early China was broached and the theory of the Shijing’s scholarly au-
thorship refuted. In a similar manner, Stéphane Feuillas does not include in his 
bibliography the complete translation of the Zhengmeng into German,32 a trans-
lation which is supplied with many annotations and a very insightful commentary 
on the language and style of Zhang Zai. Another important monograph, Sally K. 
Church’s dissertation “Jin Shengtan’s Commentary on the Xixiang ji” (1993), 
especially the part “Fools” (pp. 227-242), which is dedicated to the topic studied 
by Rainier Lanselle, is not mentioned or included in the bibliography either. 
Second, for readers who expect to find a comparative analysis of critical 
judgment in the Eastern and Western traditions (the series title Extrême-Orient, 
Extrême-Occident: Cahiers de recherches comparatives indeed suggests the 
possibility of such an approach), the issue may prove disappointing. Strictly 
speaking, there is only one passage in the book where a comparison is drawn, in 
the above-mentioned introductory note (p. 6), which is neither innovative nor 
very convincing. The last chapter of the volume, François De Gandt’s “Tastes 
and Rules: Manners of Western Criticism” (pp. 163-172), is a good illustration of 
critical discourse in the West, but it does not provide a general outline of the 
development of this discourse in Europe and draws no parallels with East Asian 
tradition. Such a comparison would certainly make a most fruitful subject for 
further research, and for this reason the perceived fault of the book might be 
considered as one of its numerous merits.  
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French Titles of the EOEO Issue 
 
De la difficulté de juger: Quelques ressources du mode critique en Chine 
et au Viêt Nam 
Le dépassement critique 
 Stéphane Feuillas 
 
I. Naissances du jugement littéraire 
Jauger l’homme, juger l’œuvre 
 François Martin 
Le désenchantement de Liu Xie. Postures et devoirs du critique littéraire selon le 
chapitre “Du connaisseur” du Wenxin diaolong  
 Valérie Lavoix 
 
II. Contrastes critiques 
Combats d’animaux. Réflexions sur le bestiaire du Zhuangzi 
 Romain Graziani 
Penser par contraste. Critique du bouddhisme et stratégies discursives dans le 
Zhengmeng de Zhang Zai (1020-1078) 
 Stéphane Feuillas 
 
III. Classer / exclure 
De la critique à la réforme de la bureaucratie dans le Viêt Nam classique 
 Emmanuel Poisson 
L’autre comme «imbécile»: le système clos de la critique comme opération d'in-
clusion /exclusion 
 Rainier Lanselle 
 
IV. Regard extérieur 
Le goût et les règles: les usages de la critique en Occident 
François De Gandt 
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